The Third World War has rapidly gained momentum in recent weeks and months – and has thus thrust the Middle East back into the global spotlight with full force as one of the centers of this war. The war in Palestine, a direct military exchange between Israel and Iran and the severe turmoil in Turkey and North Kurdistan following the local elections are just some of the painful symptoms that point to a fundamental trend in the region. The reorganization of the Middle East, which has been ongoing for more than 30 years, is in an extremely critical phase in which the various players are trying to create new realities. It is not only global powers such as the USA, EU and China or regional powers such as Turkey and Iran that are influencing this process. The peoples of the Middle East and the social forces they support, above all the Kurds and the Kurdistan Freedom Movement gathered around the PKK, are also exerting a strong influence on the reshaping of the region. Given the pace of current developments, it seems advisable to focus on some of the strategic events and trends of recent weeks and months: The insistence on pushing through the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe-Economic Corridor), the multifaceted crisis of the Turkish state in the face of the electoral defeat of the fascist AKP-MHP government in the local elections, and the increased pace with which the Kurdistan Freedom Movement has recently been advocating for an end to the colonization of Kurdistan and for the democratization of the Middle East. These key developments show the enormous importance of the current year for the reshaping of Kurdistan, the Middle East and ultimately the entire global order.
The IMEC and the “corridorization of the world”
On September 15, 2020, representatives of Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain signed the so-called “Abraham Accords” in Washington, under which the two Arab states agreed to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations. Since then, the USA has intensified its efforts to concretely shape the reorganization of the Middle East. On the margins of the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, another important step was taken in this direction: the heads of state and government of the USA, India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Italy, Germany, France and the EU as an association of states announced the start of the establishment of the IMEC. The aim is to connect East and West Eurasia – i.e. India and Europe – via the Middle East in the form of a new transportation, pipeline, electricity and data cable network. This geostrategically momentous decision is one of the driving factors behind the escalation of conflicts that can be observed in the Middle East since the fall of 2023.
The IMEC is one of a long list of corridor projects with which the leading powers of capitalist modernity want to reshape the world in their favor. China has been pursuing a very ambitious project since 2013 with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as the ‘New Silk Road’), which encompasses 150 countries along five land corridors and one sea corridor. At the end of 2021, the EU announced investments of 300 billion euros in infrastructure projects worldwide in the form of the Global Gateway Initiative, which was widely seen as a counter-project to the BRI. Another project is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC, which runs from India via Iran and Azerbaijan to Russia), which is based on a decision made by India, Russia and Iran in 2002. Work continues on this corridor, shown by India’s decision in May of this year to invest heavily in the Iranian port of Chabahar. With the IMEC, another corridor project has now been presented to the global public under the leadership of the USA. The list of all such agreements, the implementation of which is ultimately a question of the balance of power between the various competing powers, is much longer. The fact that all the leading powers of capitalist modernity, including numerous regional powers, are working on the implementation of such projects has already prompted the Indian think tank member Dr. N. Janardhan to speak of a “corridorization of the world” (1).
In recent months, Turkey’s opposition to the IMEC has played a decisive role in plunging the Middle East into an even more serious escalation of war. In November last year, Duran Kalkan, a member of the PKK Executive Council, pointed out Turkey’s involvement in the Hamas attack on Israel against this background: “In a similar way, he [Erdoğan] got Hamas to attack Israel and thus triggered a war. The Turkish state is doing this to make the region unsafe and to ensure that the energy supply route will lead through Turkey.” (2) Unfortunately, this analysis has received too little attention in the international media and among democratic forces. Without recognizing Turkey as a driving force behind Islamist forces such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, it is impossible to understand the ever-increasing spiral of violence in the Middle East. Even a brief look at Turkey-Hamas relations speaks volumes (3): Turkey does not recognize Hamas as a terrorist group. Instead, Erdoğan has repeatedly referred to the organization as a “resistance group”. Ismail Haniya, the political leader of Hamas, has been in Turkey since 2012 at Erdoğan’s invitation and has also received a Turkish passport. Hamas has several accounts in Turkish banks and is said to have received up to 300 million euros per year from Turkey. Since October 7 last year, Hamas leader Hanija has met Erdoğan and the Turkish foreign minister several times, most recently on April 20 this year. The last meeting prompted Israeli Foreign Minister Katz to voice clear criticism at the end of May: “The one who should be accused of genocide is dictator Erdogan, who murders his Kurdish citizens, occupies the northern part of Cyprus and commits crimes against humanity.” (4) It is therefore very reasonable to assume that the Turkish state has direct influence on the leadership of Hamas. Erdoğan had reacted very angrily to the IMEC’s announcement on his return from the G20 summit last September: “There will be no corridor without Turkey. The most suitable route for the East-West connection runs through Turkey.” (5) This blatant threat was the starting signal for Turkish intervention against the IMEC. This intervention continues to this day, and not only in the form of Turkey’s financial, political, logistical (6) and very probably also military support for Hamas. Erdoğan’s visit to Iraq on April 22 this year also took place in this context. At the top of the Turkish agenda was the so-called “Development Road”. This is another corridor project consisting of a rail, road and pipeline network to connect the Persian Gulf with Europe via Iraq and Turkey. Turkey is therefore openly working on a regional alternative to the IMEC. KCK co-chair Besê Hozat recently described this project as a “trap for Iraq” with which Turkey is covering up its “neo-Ottoman, occupying and expansionist policy” (7).
Even after the foreseeable expulsion of Hamas from Gaza, Turkey will seek to further destabilize the Middle East and thus prevent the IMEC. With the help of Hezbollah, for example, it could attempt to destabilize Lebanon, i.e. the immediate vicinity of the port city of Haifa – an indispensable IMEC hub. The same applies to the nearby region of Aleppo in northern Syria, which Turkey could once again plunge into chaos through the Islamist militias it controls in Idlib, Efrîn and Cerablûs. And in Iraq, too, Turkey has far-reaching opportunities to stir up conflicts through tens of thousands of its own soldiers, the South Kurdish party PDK and Turkmen militias in the area of Kirkuk.
However, the powers involved in the IMEC continue to insist with all their might on pushing through the project. This is evident from the brutality of the Israeli warfare in Gaza alone. Even though Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar recently had to admit that developments in the region were “a source of concern for us and the kind of expectation we had when the agreement was signed in September, we have had to adjust it a bit” (8), India remains committed to the implementation of the IMEC: “We are dead serious about it [IMEC] and have been talking to each other. Not everything has to fall in place for something to start. Wherever we can get moving, we will get moving,” (9) said the Indian Foreign Minister in May. Accordingly, a decision seems to have been made in IMEC circles to begin the first practical steps towards implementation in the Gulf region, while work around the port of Haifa is likely to remain difficult for the time being. A visit by representatives of the Indian shipping and trade ministries to the UAE in May 2024, during which the ports of Kandla, Khalifa and Jebel Ali were visited, fits into this picture. (10) Another important development is the appointment of Gérard Mestrallet as France’s IMEC Special Envoy by French President Macron in February. Mestrallet recently advocated Marseille as “European bridgehead of the future corridor” and demanded that “we shouldn’t wait until the end of the [Gaza] war to work on the implementation of the project” (11).
Turkey after the elections: a (too) cautious look in the mirror
The destabilization of the Middle East by the Turkish state did not begin as a reaction to the IMEC. On the basis of the neo-Ottoman Misak-ı Milli strategy (i.e. ‘National Pact’, aiming at the Turkish annexation of northern Syria and northern Iraq, among others), Turkey has been bluntly pursuing economic, political and military hegemony in the region since the beginning of the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011. This includes, in particular, the brutal war against the Kurds and their self-organization in North Kurdistan (Turkey), Rojava (Syria) and South Kurdistan (Iraq). Since June 2015, i.e. nine years now, the Turkish state has been mobilizing all its resources for this war. According to official figures, Turkey has spent more than 191 billion dollars on armaments and its military during this period. Between 2023 and 2024 alone, the Turkish military’s budget was increased by 150% (12). Yet, it can be assumed that the actual expenditure on intelligence, police, military, armaments, etc. is significantly higher.
After nine years of war, the Turkish state and its AKP-MHP government are now facing a social, political, economic and military shambles. Even according to official government sources, around a third of the population lives in poverty (13). The crisis has been particularly evident since the AKP’s defeat in the local elections on March 31, 2024. The strong performance of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) and the popular uprising by hundreds of thousands of DEM Party (Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi) supporters in the North Kurdish city of Wan in defense of the election results have put Erdoğan and his government under severe pressure. Since then, three strands have dominated the country’s politics:
Open power struggles are taking place within the AKP-MHP government camp in the form of legal skirmishes, while Erdoğan is also trying to calm the opposition party CHP by making concessions. For example, on the day the verdict against leading HDP politicians was announced, he released seven generals from prison who can be ideologically associated with the CHP. In addition, Erdoğan courted the new CHP leader Özel with a meeting on May 3 that was accompanied by pompous media coverage and has since held out the prospect of further meetings. Erdoğan’s aim is to win over the CHP for the adoption of a new constitution and thereby secure the opposition’s support for his regime. At the same time, he is preparing for the failure of this attempt and recently issued a decree granting himself the sole right to order a general mobilization and declare war. This decision is also important in terms of foreign policy, as the AKP-MHP government continues to openly threaten new ground attacks in Rojava/North Syria and South Kurdistan/northern Iraq.
The CHP has so far publicly opposed a new constitution, but at the same time is trying to initiate its own debate on AKP-MHP policy under the slogan of “normalization”. In doing so, the party appears to be aiming to push Erdoğan further into a corner in order to force him to make political concessions for the CHP’s clientele, but without bringing about fundamental changes in Turkish state policy. The CHP openly criticizes the miserable state of the country’s economy and laments the poverty and hunger of the population, for example during a series of protests in Istanbul and Ankara in May, where tens of thousands took to the streets. But the most important reason for the economic crisis – the war against the Kurds – has so far not been mentioned by the CHP.
It is precisely this serious mistake of the CHP that prompted KCK co-chair Besê Hozat to issue the following warning in an interview at the end of May: “If we look at the work of the CHP after the local elections, we can describe it as very mediocre. Since then, it has lost almost all of its potential to oppose and criticize the government. […] Currently there is talk of ‘normalization’. But what does such a normalization mean in Turkey? It means the end of the torture and isolation system in İmralı [reference to Abdullah Öcalan’s imprisonment]. It means ensuring the health, safety and freedom of Rêber Apo [Abdullah Öcalan]. And it means solving the Kurdish question on a democratic basis. If all this happens, justice, democracy and freedom will prevail in Turkey. Normalization does not mean the release of seven generals. Normalization does not mean holding talks with the opposition. Nor does normalization mean the release of a few Gezi prisoners.” (14) The above-mentioned third strand in Turkey’s current political landscape is represented by the DEM party and pursues a policy similar to that described by Besê Hozat. Practically every day in parliament and at protest rallies, representatives of the party demand an end to the total isolation of Abdullah Öcalan, a stop to state repression against Kurdish politicians and activists, an end to the war in Turkey, Iraq and Syria against the Kurdish population there and a real “normalization” through practical steps to solve the Kurdish question in Turkey. The two DEM party co-chairs Tuncer Bakırhan and Tülay Hatimoğulları also met with CHP leader Özgür Özel at the beginning of May to discuss these issues.
Even this brief look at the country’s current political dynamics shows that there is an opportunity for democratic change in Turkey after the local elections. However, it is clear that this cannot happen with the current AKP-MHP government. Erdoğan, Bahceli and many cadres in the state bureaucracy have committed numerous war and human rights crimes in the last 22 years of their rule. They all belong before the International Criminal Court in The Hague as soon as possible, just like Netanyahu or the Hamas leadership. The parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition in the country therefore needs to seize the opportunity, increase the pressure on the government and pave the way for real “normalization” in Turkey by forcing new elections.
Great dynamics of the Kurdish freedom struggle in 2024
The Kurdish people’s struggle for freedom is not limited to parliamentary work with the help of parties such as the DEM Party. Over the course of the past 50 years, a broad social movement has developed that offers a very diverse resistance in line with its own organizational strength and the respective political phase. Currently, the pace of this struggle is particularly high, with new diplomatic, political and military initiatives being launched every day.
The global campaign “Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan – A Political Solution to the Kurdish Question”, which has been ongoing since October last year, continues to build up pressure on responsible institutions such as the Turkish Ministry of Justice, the Council of Europe and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The broad international support from solidarity groups, public messages from prominent figures such as Slavoj Žižek and the protest by well over 100,000 people in Cologne in February and in Frankfurt am Main in March 2024 are all important parts of this campaign. The diplomatic pressure on the EU and Turkey to acknowledge their joint responsibility for the total isolation of Abdullah Öcalan and to end it immediately therefore continues. This demand has recently been reiterated in various ways: Dozens of prominent figures from the UK, Ireland, Italy and the US – including Noam Chomsky and Jeremy Corbyn – sent an open letter to CPT President Alan Mitchell calling for a delegation to be sent immediately to the Turkish prison island of İmralı; DEM Party MPs Cengiz Çiçek and Newroz Uysal requested the establishment of a special committee in the Turkish parliament to provide clarity on the situation on the prison island of İmralı; in an open letter, dozens of Italian organizations, politicians, lawyers, etc. called on the CPT to send a delegation to İmralı and to ensure Öcalan’s contact with his lawyers and his family; 81 organizations and individuals from Spain also joined these demands in another open letter to the CPT; the spokespersons of the DEM Party’s Legal Commission applied to the Turkish Ministry of Justice for permission to visit Abdullah Öcalan; as part of a letter campaign organized by the Kurdish women’s movement TJK-E, over a thousand people sent letters to the CPT demanding immediate effective action against the isolation of Abdullah Öcalan; at the beginning of June, 93 public and political figures from Germany also sent a letter to the CPT demanding that a team of experts be sent to İmralı to clarify Abdullah Öcalan’s situation. The fact that the Turkish state, with the support of the EU, the UK and the US, continues to insist on its isolation policy was demonstrated at the end of May by a decision of the Bursa Court responsible for İmralı: a further six-month ban on visits by Abdullah Öcalan’s lawyers. Yet, such decisions only increase the anger of the Kurds and their international friends, which is why they will stand up all the more resolutely for Abdullah Öcalan’s freedom in the future.
From a political perspective, the Kurdish population in North Kurdistan (eastern Turkey) in particular is currently very much alive. Since April 4, 2024, thousands of imprisoned PKK and PAJK members in Turkish prisons have adjusted their protest against the total isolation of Abdullah Öcalan, which began last year as a hunger strike, and are now continuing it in the form of refusing to make telephone calls, attending court proceedings in person and visiting family members. They have thus decided to live under isolation conditions comparable to those of Abdullah Öcalan. This is accompanied by weekly protests in front of prisons in Turkey and North Kurdistan. Under the slogan “Raise your voice for freedom”, the mothers and fathers of prisoners gather by the hundreds in cities such as Amed, Êlih (Batman), Mersin, Adana, Izmir and Istanbul, thus defying massive attempts at intimidation and repression by the state. In a by-election in the Kurdish district town of Curnê Reş (tr.: Hilvan), the two DEM party candidates won clearly at the beginning of June. This confirmed the trend from the local elections on March 31, 2024. Despite the enormous debts accumulated by the AKP trustees, AKP city administration employees refusing to work and daily police repression, the more than 70 city administrations of the DEM party have been working hard since the beginning of April to make practical improvements to people’s lives. Overall, since the local elections, it can be observed that the people of North Kurdistan express their anger very courageously and spontaneously. Apart from this, there are also long-term protests, such as the “Saturday Mothers” rally held every Saturday in Istanbul, which make an important contribution to the political struggle of the Kurdish population in Turkey with their demand for a reappraisal of thousands of murders by the Turkish state in the 1990s. At the end of May, the 1000th week of the “Saturday Mothers” protests was celebrated with a major rally on the Istiklal Street in Istanbul, which was also widely reported on in the international media.
Due to the ongoing colonization and genocide policy of the Turkish state and its NATO allies against the Kurds, military resistance still remains the central means. There have also been important developments in this area recently. In view of Erdoğan’s threat to expand the Turkish occupation operation in South Kurdistan (northern Iraq) this summer, which has been ongoing since 2021, the resistance of the HPG and YJA-Star guerrilla forces continues with great intensity. After the HPG announced the shooting down of 15 Turkish drones in the spring, the 16th of these multi-million dollar war machines was shot down by the guerrillas on May 27, 2024. The guerrilla forces have thus proven that in the long term they will be able to destroy Turkish army drones, i.e. one of the central pillars of Turkish warfare. And that is not all: As recent attacks in the South Kurdish region of Zap on several Turkish military posts show, the guerrillas now also have kamikaze drones at their disposal (15). This enables them to attack Turkish positions in the region even more effectively and frequently from a distance. And yet, the Turkish state’s attacks on the Medya Defense Zones, areas controlled by the guerrillas in South Kurdistan, continue. The HPG’s balance sheet for May of this year illustrates just how heavy the daily fighting in the region is: 43 Turkish soldiers were killed and 4 injured in 82 HPG and YJA-Star attacks on the Turkish occupation forces. In addition to a downed Aksungur drone – the most expensive model of the Turkish drone series – a Turkish helicopter was also damaged by guerrilla fire. According to the HPG, the Turkish occupying army carried out 245 airstrikes, 43 helicopter attacks, 61 attacks with kamikaze drones, 37 attacks with prohibited explosives and 286 chemical weapons attacks (16). It is particularly noteworthy that the Turkish military has once again massively increased the use of chemical weapons against the guerrillas’ cave and tunnel systems in recent weeks. Murat Karayılan, HPG commander and member of the Executive Council of the PKK, therefore stated in a recent interview: “This resistance is something completely new for humanity in historical terms. A large army equipped with the latest weapons technology has been stopped and the resistance against it will continue. This is not an everyday thing. Yes, at the moment we are not succeeding in adequately communicating this resistance to the world public. There are two aspects to this: The first is that for three years [the guerrillas] have been pursuing a war doctrine that has been able to stop NATO’s second largest army. That is the most remarkable aspect. The second is that prohibited weapons are being used here. Chemical weapons, tactical nuclear weapons and various other types of weapons. […] Do our people in Kurdistan or in Europe feel that a war is raging here around the clock? No, they do not.” (17) The military resistance against the genocide policy of the Turkish state has also intensified in numerous cities in Turkey and North Kurdistan in recent weeks. Organizations such as the HBDH (“United Revolutionary Movement of the Peoples”), Jinên Tolhildêr (“Avenging Women”) and MAK (“Kurdistan Freedom Militias”) carried out a total of 23 attacks in over ten different cities and regions in Turkey and North Kurdistan in May. Among others, numerous factories of fascist owners, drug dealers and military bases were attacked and a Turkish non-commissioned officer was killed. This clearly shows that the military resistance in North Kurdistan and Turkey is increasingly shifting to the cities, which is tantamount to a significant shift away from traditional guerrilla strategies.
Shaping the future
The Kurds’ struggle for freedom proves day after day how much influence societies can have on developments in their homeland and the world. All they need to do is become aware of their strength, understand themselves as actors and strengthen their self-organization accordingly. Supporting existing freedom struggles in conjunction with developing resistance in the capitalist centers of the world is of great importance. Because the wars, exploitation and ecological destruction of the hegemonic powers of capitalist modernity know no pauses or limits. The intensity and determination with which all morally thinking and politically active people will stand up for freedom, democracy and equality this year will be correspondingly high. The brief insight into the crises and contradictions of capitalist modernity mentioned above shows that the time is more than favorable for this. There is no doubt that looking to Kurdistan will continue to provide much inspiration for the freedom struggles of the peoples of the world in the near future.
References
(1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=81O_Reg-Rio
(2) https://anfdeutsch.com/aktuelles/kalkan-Erdo%C4%9Fan-steht-hinter-dem-hamas-angriff-auf-israel-39655
(3) https://www.dw.com/de/Erdo%C4%9Fan-hanija-hamas-t%C3%BCrkei-beziehungen/a-68883427
(4) https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/international/israeli-fm-hits-back-at-erdogans-genocide-accusation-with-cyprus-reference/
(5) https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-Erdo%C4%9Fan-hindistan-orta-dogu-avrupa-ekonomi-koridoru-turkiyesiz-olmaz/2989082
(6) https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-defends-hamas-says-members-are-being-treated-turkish-hospitals-2024-05-13/
(7) https://medyanews.net/kcks-bese-hozat-calls-on-the-people-of-iraqi-kurdistan-to-rise-up-against-turkish-occupation/
(8) https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/other/matter-of-concern-eam-jaishankar-on-delay-in-imec-implementation-in-view-of-situation-in-west-asia/ar-BB1mePQj
(9) https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/dead-serious-about-imec-focussed-on-re-engineering-logistics-map-eam-124051701168_1.html
(10) https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/indian-delegation-holds-talks-with-key-entities-in-uae-on-imeec-12725978.html
(11) https://www.actu-transport-logistique.fr/journal-de-la-marine-marchande/logistique/gerard-mestrallet-representant-de-limec-pour-la-france-le-port-de-marseille-doit-etre-la-tete-de-pont-europeenne-du-futur-corridor-905673.php
(12) https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-allocate-150-more-defense-budget-2024-minister-2023-10-17/
(13) https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/08/economic-mismanagement-and-rising-prices-just-how-bad-is-poverty-in-turkey
(14) https://firatnews.com/kurdistan/-198407
(15) https://firatnews.com/kurdistan/Ozel-teknikle-yapilan-eylemin-goruntusu-yayinlandi-198917
(16) https://firatnews.com/kurdistan/hpg-den-mayis-ayi-bilancosu-43-isgalci-cezalandirildi-1-sIha-dusuruldu-198911
(17) https://firatnews.com/guncel/karayilan-dusman-gerekli-yaniti-alir-198672
