The world was shaken in the first days of the new year. U.S. President Donald Trump, who had been building up warships and tightening the blockade on Venezuela, including closing its airspace, launched “Operation Absolute Resolution” while on vacation in Florida. We interviewed Gerardo Rojas (*). His analysis, experience, and perspective help shed light on the events of recent weeks, which at times have been abrupt and unexpected.
U.S. warplanes and Delta Force helicopters bombed the capital Caracas, as well as La Guaira, Miranda, and Aragua, during the night of January 2 and the early hours of January 3. In just two and a half hours, President Nicolás Maduro and the First Lady, and former President of the National Assembly (2006-2011), Cilia Flores, were captured by the United States and taken to New York. How could this happen so quickly? What happened in Venezuela?
The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, carried out in the early hours of January 3 as part of the U.S. operation “Absolute Resolution,” raised more questions than answers. In less than two and a half hours, U.S. attack helicopters and special forces struck strategic points in Caracas, La Guaira, Miranda, and Aragua. They bypassed defense systems and captured the president along with his wife, First Lady Cilia Flores. The speed of the operation raised a central question: how was such an outcome possible without internal collaboration?
It is important to note, however, that there was military resistance to Maduro’s abduction, though it proved insufficient. More than 108 people, most of them members of the armed forces, were killed while resisting Trump’s attack.
In the days leading up to the assault, warning signs were accumulating. Maduro had publicly proposed a negotiation table with Washington. Weeks earlier, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez had met in Miami with actors linked to the conflict. Meanwhile, Russia and China pursued diplomatic channels without real capacity to block the operation, and several Latin American governments softened their positions or stepped back.
Hours after the attack, Donald Trump confirmed that negotiations had taken place with Delcy Rodríguez and ruled out the opposition led by María Corina Machado as a viable governing alternative. Shortly afterwards, a military adviser close to Senator Marco Rubio claimed that Maduro “was handed over by Venezuelans themselves.”
Since then, there have been rapid developments, including unexpected moves in communication between both countries. Talks advanced to the point that a Venezuelan government envoy travelled to Washington to meet U.S. officials and moved toward reopening Venezuela’s embassy, on Thursday, January 15. Félix Plasencia became the first official representative of Chavismo – the country’s ruling political movement – to visit the U.S. capital in years. His trip underscored the speed of the thaw in relations following Maduro’s capture.
Less than twelve hours later, interim President Delcy Rodríguez presented a draft law for a new Hydrocarbons Act and another bill aimed at accelerating investment procedures for companies seeking to operate in Venezuela. These measures directly affect the hydrocarbons sector. Prior to this, Rodríguez held a lengthy online meeting with Donald Trump. The following day, another development shocked the Bolivarian public and the international community: Delcy Rodríguez met with the CIA.
There is ongoing debate over why the Venezuelan military and police did not stop the U.S. aircraft, helicopters, and special forces. Defence Minister General Vladimir Padrino López, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello Rondón, and Vice President Delcy Rodríguez held key positions at the time. Do these individuals raise unanswered questions?
As mentioned earlier, at least 108 people, mostly military personnel, were killed resisting Trump’s attack. This confirms that resistance to place, but in the face of an overwhelming imbalance of forces.
It would be premature to speculate about the responsibilities of General Padrino López, Interior Minister Cabello Rondón, or Vice President Rodríguez in relation to the attack on Venezuela’s sovereignty and Maduro’s abduction. Donald Trump himself stated that prior meetings had taken place to reach the current situation. These claims have not been officially denied by the Venezuelan government.
Time and formal investigations will determine what happened and who may have been involved internally. What can already be assessed, without speculation, are the actions taken by the government over the past two weeks. They have unfolded at a striking pace and point not only toward normalising diplomatic relations with the Trump administration, but also towards further liberalisation of key sectors of the Venezuelan economy. A striking image of this “normalisation” is the photograph of Delcy Rodríguez meeting with CIA Director John Ratcliffe, by order of President Trump. This meeting leaves a bitter taste, given that the agency played a central role in the abduction operation and in the deaths of more than 108 people.
Trump repeatedly emphasised Venezuela’s oil reserves, both before and after the attack. He even stated that “the Interim Authorities in Venezuela will deliver between 30 and 50 MILLION barrels of high-quality sanctioned oil to the United States of America.” Was oil the sole motive? What other calculations are at play?
Trump’s statements reignited debate over the real motivations behind the offensive. Oil is central, particularly in maintaining the petrodollar system. As national and alternative currencies gain ground, controlling the world’s largest oil reserves and selling them in dollars serves a key U.S. objective: strengthening the dollar. Still, oil is far from the only factor.
The conflict should not be understood as an immediate production issue. It is about strategic access and control. The goal is to ensure that U.S. companies enter the Venezuelan market as part of an expanded national security doctrine. From this perspective, even private investment is subordinated to political decisions. Trump could pressure companies to invest if deemed necessary.
Just twelve days after the attack and Maduro’s abduction, interim President Rodríguez introduced two bills: one for a new hydrocarbons law, and another to accelerate investment by companies such as Chevron and Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA. These reforms would loosen agreements once U.S. sanctions are lifted. This demand came directly from U.S. oil companies, which reminded Trump that their withdrawal from Venezuela resulted from U.S. sanctions, not Venezuelan policy.
This access is also functional because many U.S. refineries are specifically designed to process heavy Venezuelan crude oil. The political cost has been enormous: violating sovereignty and international law. Domestically, controlling oil prices to lower fuel costs remains a central priority of Trumpism.
Reducing the conflict to oil alone, however, is incomplete. Venezuela is also part of a broader struggle over strategic resources such as gold, coltan, rare earths, and water. These resources are increasingly valuable amid the global energy transition. Added to this are long-term geopolitical interests: control of the Caribbean, access to the Atlantic and Pacific, South American projection, and proximity to recent oil discoveries in Guyana.
From this angle, Trump’s policy represents an updated version of the Monroe Doctrine, adapted to the MAGA framework. The message to the hemisphere is clear: any political project that challenges U.S. foreign policy, even rhetorically, can face direct pressure. This show of power does not always require troops. Sometimes a statement, a call, or a social media post is enough.
This logic predates Trump. The continuation of sanctions that existed under Joe Biden confirms that this is a long-term state policy. Even a political shift in Washington does not guarantee a substantive change if core power structures view these measures as essential to U.S. security.
Following Maduro’s abduction, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez assumed the presidency, as mandated by the Constitution. Trump, meanwhile, declared that the United States now had control. What should be expected in Venezuela? Are there self-defence forces or communes capable of resisting land invasions?
Rodríguez’s appointment required an interpretation by the Supreme Court. If Maduro’s absence were deemed permanent, elections would have been mandatory, as after Hugo Chávez’s death. This explains the insistence on framing Maduro as president and emphasising his rescue. The aim was to preserve institutional stability and buy time under intense external pressure.
In the days after the abduction, a dual movement emerged. Trump issued aggressive statements, while the Venezuelan state initially adopted strategic silence and de-escalatory gestures. That silence faded. Rodríguez later called for national unity, warning that “the enemy’s greatest victory would be division.” She added that Venezuela was entering a phase of resistance requiring patience, strategic caution, and clear goals: preserving peace, rescuing Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, and maintaining political power to defend the people.
This stance is understandable. What is at stake is peace and institutional continuity. Yet coherence requires internal policies that genuinely unite the population. No negotiation with Trump alone can achieve that. Proposed legal reforms, especially the hydrocarbons law, reveal at least tacit collaboration with Trump. The final text will be decisive, but it clearly signals a relaxation of principles established under Hugo Chávez to build a sovereign industry. Combined with Rodríguez’s meeting with the CIA, it suggests that former red lines no longer exist.
Maduro himself sought normalisation with the United States. Some negotiations were already underway. This may explain the speed at which decisions are now being implemented. A telling example was the U.S. Department of Energy’s announcement regarding the management of Venezuelan oil revenues and their possible investment in the national power grid. Despite sovereign rhetoric, there is a striking alignment between Washington’s objectives and measures announced in Caracas.
Regarding internal response capacity, militia structures and communal organisations with self-defence capabilities do exist in urban and rural areas. However, they are not central to the current strategy. The priority is to demonstrate territorial control, institutional normalcy, and political unity. Self-defence presupposes a clearly identified enemy. At present, there is no credible scenario of U.S. troops entering Venezuelan territory in the short term. The main threat is internal fracture, which would weaken the state’s negotiating position.
From this perspective, three tasks are key: maintaining internal unity, ensuring social peace, and keeping negotiation channels open with the United States. The Venezuelan opposition, particularly sectors aligned with María Corina Machado, lacks cohesion, territorial control, and negotiating capacity. This explains why Trump has sidelined them.
Why has the socialist movement failed to make decisive progress in a country with the world’s largest oil reserves and vast mineral wealth? What mistakes did Nicolás Maduro make?
It is difficult to personalise the limits of Venezuela’s socialist project. The issue is structural and shared across Latin America: building emancipation while relying on extractivism. For Chávez, overcoming capitalism required communal organisation. His final call was “Commune or Nothing!”, advocating transformation from below through self-governance that challenges capital’s logic while building an alternative state and dignified life. Dependence on commodity cycles and global finance has historically constrained regional policy. Venezuela is no exception. Chávez achieved major social gains, yet the question remained: how to sustain them without reproducing capital’s extractive metabolism?
This debate connects to lithium extraction in the Southern Cone and the energy transition fuelling industries like Tesla. The challenge is universal: building alternatives with tools that reinforce the system one seeks to transcend. In a global arena shaped by U.S., Russian, and Chinese rivalry, Venezuela is one piece in a long-term confrontation. Quiet negotiations and strategic repositioning matter more than spectacular gestures. Declarations matter, but actions will define outcomes.
Why has the United Socialist Party of Venezuela failed to produce new leadership beyond its early mandates? Have leftist movements reflected on Bolivia’s recent experience? How is Bolivarian socialism debated in Latin America today?
The difficulty of building collective leadership and succession mechanisms, combined with external pressure, led to a defensive logic and shrinking internal political space. Centralisation became a shield, but weakened collective construction and leadership renewal. This pattern is not unique to Venezuela; it appears across the region, including Argentina under Cristina Fernández and Bolivia under Evo Morales.
What is unfolding in Venezuela reflects a broader global logic. External threats, security narratives, and the construction of internal enemies serve as pretexts for political, diplomatic, and military intervention. Trump has extended this rhetoric beyond Venezuela, including towards Iran.
In what was widely read as an explicit call to mobilisation against the Iranian regime, Trump publicly urged protesters to “keep protesting”, to seize institutions, and claimed that “help is on the way.” Such statements instrumentalise legitimate social movements to justify external pressure.
Equally revealing is the near-total silence of multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations. In both Venezuela and Iran, the UN has shown reluctance or incapacity to respond forcefully. This silence is not neutral. It reflects an international order in which major powers block binding action while advancing policies that violate international law.
This pattern repeats in Latin America. Beyond rhetorical condemnations, there has been no unified response to Caribbean militarisation or explicit threats toward other countries such as Colombia, Cuba, or Mexico. The absence of a collective stance-from governments, CELAC, UNASUR, or the UN-reveals regional weakness under Washington’s pressure.
Progressive and labour sectors have denounced this double standard. Sovereign governments are criminalised under vague labels like “narco-terrorism,” while extrajudicial attacks are legitimised without solid evidence. The U.S. designation of the “Cartel of the Suns” as a terrorist organisation has been widely questioned and rejected by Venezuela as a pretext for covert intervention. This narrative of internal enemies is not new. Today, it is becoming a direct foreign policy tool to erode the sovereignty of states that resist alignment with Washington. The danger is that this logic is now exported wherever U.S. interests demand it.
Latin America faces a historic crossroads. This is not about defending a single leader or country. It is about reaffirming non-intervention, popular sovereignty, and international law against unilateralism. In this context, the voice of a journalist, writer, and grassroots activist like Gerardo Rojas – who urges understanding not only events but the strategic frameworks behind them – is not just an opinion. It is a warning about the direction of the international system if social majorities and political forces fail to respond.
(*) Gerardo Rojas is a journalist, grassroots activist, and author of Chávez and Socialist Democracy. He is a community organizer in Barquisimeto, Lara, and a Chavista activist. Founder of the alternative media collective Voces Urgentes (2002), he participated in one of the first urban communes, Comuna Socialista Ataroa (2007). He served as Vice Minister in the Ministry of Communes in 2015 and is part of the communication, education, and political activism collective Tatuy TV.
The interview was conducted by Argentine journalist, human rights activist and member of Argentina’s Alternative Media Network Lucrecia Kuri for the Kurdish daily newspaper Yeni Yaşam Gazetesi and was first published on 3 February 2026.